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Category: Delicts and torts

Romantic Partner Torts: Contemporary Problems and the Legal History of Taking Heartbreak Seriously

by Dr Jinal Dadiya, Lecturer in Law, Goldsmiths University of London

Introduction

There has been a recent rise in former romantic partners instituting tortious actions against one another for events which took place within the course of their romantic relationships. This is the case both in the UK,[1] and in other common law jurisdictions.[2] In the last year, English courts have seen at least two influential personalities being sued by their romantic partners in tort.[3] Currently, the law of obligations tries to resolve such disputes by applying general standards of private law, without however recognising special duties or exceptions on account of the parties’ romantic involvement. This reticence has been rationalised through appeals to discretion, emotional complexity, the public-private divide, and the perceived moral volatility of intimacy.[4] As courts and legislatures confront coercive control, emotional manipulation, and technologically mediated abuse, an important jurisprudential reconsideration is underway: what constitutes a civil wrong in the context of romantic relationships, and how might tort law be recalibrated to attend to it? In this blog entry, I argue that normative answers may be found in legal histories of heartbreak.

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Attributing Wrongdoing Without Persons? Competition Law and the Challenge to Delict Theory: Part II

by Grigoris Bacharis, Lecturer in Private Law, Edinburgh Law School

I. Introduction

In my previous post, I explored the emergence of enforcement or regulatory delicts and, in particular, how the doctrine of the undertaking transitioned from public enforcement to competition damages claims. I argued that this development represents a striking departure from private law’s commitment to the concept of legal personality. By attributing liability not to a legal person but to an “economic unit,” the doctrine unsettles, among other things, the principle that responsibility must track wrongdoing and personhood.

As a tentative explanation for why this extension only applies in competition law, I proposed that the law tolerates such a radical departure from the principle of legal personality because there are certain delicts, such as competition damages, that have a hybrid character, part private, part public.

But should the law of delict and tort accommodate this shift? I argue that while the undertaking doctrine might be defensible on enforcement grounds, its coherence with private law’s normative architecture is deeply contested.

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Attributing Wrongdoing Without Persons? Competition Law and the Challenge to Delict Theory: Part I

by Grigoris Bacharis, Lecturer in Private Law, Edinburgh Law School

I. Introduction

I begin with a broad claim that I cannot fully defend here,[1] but wish to illustrate in part: significant areas of European delict (or tort) law are undergoing a subtle but meaningful transformation. Across domains such as environmental harm, data protection, and competition enforcement, delictual claims are increasingly mobilised to serve regulatory aims. As scholars like Kysar have noted, claimants are no longer simply seeking redress for private wrongs.[2] They are enforcing public norms through private litigation.

This shift gives rise to what might be called enforcement or regulatory delicts: private actions that retain the formal structure of delict law but pursue objectives—deterrence, compliance, and systemic accountability—that are quintessentially public. The trend is inspired mainly by American legal practice, where private enforcement, via torts, federal claims, mass litigation, and settlements, is widespread and arguably expanding.[3]

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Primary rights and liability in delict

By John MacLeod, Senior Lecturer in Private Law, University of Edinburgh 

Since the turn of the 21st century, Common Lawyers have discussed the basis of tortious liability extensively.[1] In particular, defences have been mounted against instrumentalism (i.e. considering law in terms of social policy). Much of the analysis turns on the idea that tort is about responding to infringements of primary rights (or to breach of primary duties). Primary rights are rights (and primary duties are duties) which do not arise from infringement of another right. They are contrasted with secondary rights, which do arise from such infringements. Property rights or rights to contractual performance are primary; rights to compensation for culpable damage or breach of contract are secondary.

If torts are thus conceptualised, the reasons which justify a primary right explain the wrongfulness of the tortious action and so support liability. Justifications for primary rights can vary and need not depend on some general logic within tort law.

What, if anything, does this literature mean for Scotland?

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The Willy’s Chocolate Experience debacle: A classic case for solatium in damages for breach of contract?

by Thorsten Lauterbach, Teaching Excellence Fellow, Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen

It will have been difficult not to see the tale of woe behind the Willy’s Chocolate Experience, a story that dominated headlines[1] in Scotland and beyond,[2] as it went viral on social media: children and their parents had been looking forward to around an hour of exhilarating entertainment, at up to £35 per ticket, only to receive the exact opposite. It is a box of wondrous legal issues aplenty: advertising, employment law, intellectual property law, consumer law, contract law – and there may well be some more. This blog entry looks at this story from a consumer redress angle, particularly focusing on solatium for breach of contract in common law, and how the thinking on this concept was driven by one – or two – prominent Scots.

What happened?

Advertising via the Willy’s Chocolate Experience website had promised “a place where chocolate dreams become reality. Book your adventure now and embark on a journey filled with wondrous creations and enchanting surprises at every turn!”,[3] “an enchanted garden, with giant sweets, vibrant blooms, mysterious looking sculptures, and magical surprises that add an extra layer of wonder to your Chocolatey Experience!”,[4] Imagination Lab, Twilight Tunnel – an “event [which] guarantees an immersive and delightful entertainment experience suitable for aged 3+ years old”.[5] However, the reality turned out to be different.

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