“Are the ‘goods of studying’ and the ‘goods of academic disciplines’ made explicit to our students? Are these discussed in relation to ‘virtues’ that contribute to the student’s overall life and well-being? If not, could they be?” asks Dr Anton Elloway, a Teaching Fellow in English Language Education↗️ at the Centre for Open Learning↗️. He explains the concept of practice by the Scottish-American philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre by connecting it to academic study and the university classroom.
In this brief post, I turn to the concept of practice as articulated by the Scottish-American philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, and draw connections to academic study and the university classroom. I suggest that regarding what we and our students do as a practice – and the classroom as one of its primary spaces – can help reveal (particularly when made explicit) some of the internal goods inherent to our pedagogical activities. This, in turn, invites reflection on the virtues of our academic pursuits.
Firstly, what does MacIntyre mean by practice?
By a ‘practice’ I mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. (Alasdair MacIntyre, 2004: 187)
Chess, as MacIntyre notes, is a practice: it is a socially established activity where participants, in the course of both learning about and playing the game, come to recognise internal goods such as ‘analytic skill, strategic imagination, and competitive intensity’ (MacIntyre, 2004: 188), systematically improving their abilities over time. Other practices he mentions include football, architecture, farming, music, painting, and the enquiries of physics, chemistry, biology, and history.
While MacIntyre argues that teaching is not a practice but a component within various practices (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002), others such as Joseph Dunne (2003) contend that teaching itself exhibits all the characteristics of a practice. For the purposes of my argument, however, whether teaching is considered a practice itself or an integral part of broader educational practices is of secondary importance.
MacIntyre adds that closely connected to the goods internal to a practice are the virtues:
A virtue is an acquired human quality, the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods. (Alasdair MacIntyre, 2004: 187)
There are at least two points to make here. Firstly, as educators, we are tasked with introducing students to our discipline, affording them opportunities to realise the goods internal to our discipline, whether in mathematics, music, or any other field.
Secondly, participating in a practice entails acquiring and developing the virtues necessary to recognise and actualise its internal goods. MacIntyre mentions, for example, the virtues of honesty, courage, and justice, as being fundamental to most if not all practices, including academic study (for example, in writing honestly and ensuring proper attribution of work). Moreover, these virtues clearly extend beyond particular practices and roles, such as engaging in chess or being a student – they permeate all aspects of our lives.
So, I might pose the following questions:
- Are the goods of studying and the goods of academic disciplines made explicit to our students?
- And are these discussed in relation to virtues that contribute to the student’s overall life and well-being?
- If not, could they be? Perhaps we could incorporate discussions on internal goods and virtues into our classrooms.
Acknowledging the intrinsic goods within a discipline and aligning academic pursuits with virtues is surely worthy of consideration. By fostering this alignment, we would do more than cultivate proficiency in our students’ respective fields; we would perhaps help empower them to evolve into thoughtful contributors to a life marked by virtue.
References
Alasdair MacIntyre (2004). After virtue: a study in moral theory (second edition). London: Duckworth.
Alasdair MacIntyre and Joseph Dunne (2002). Alasdair MacIntyre on education: in dialogue with Joseph Dunne. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 36(1).
Joseph Dunne (2003). Arguing for teaching as a practice: a reply to Alasdair MacIntyre. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 37(2).
Anton Elloway
Dr Anton Elloway, a Teaching Fellow in English Language Education at the Centre for Open Learning, specialises in English for Academic Purposes (EAP). He has recently earned a doctorate from the University of Edinburgh, where he explored the connections between Hannah Arendt’s political and educational work and EAP.
