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Edinburgh Private Law Blog Posts

Kinghorn v Wood and the origins of trusts in Scotland

by León Carmona Fontaine, PhD Student at Edinburgh Law School*

If there was a Scottish case from the 1620s in which a Scottish court had decided that there was a sham trust, it would be surprising and significant for both historical and comparative reasons. For a start, Scots lawyers usually consider that a distinct institution known as a trust appeared in Scotland in the late 17th century, and more decisively in the 18th century.[1] Second, sham trusts are usually seen as a recent English legal development. The term ‘sham’ gained a defined legal meaning in England between the late 19th century and the second half of the 20th century (Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786, 802),[2] and the first case in which an English court found a declaration of trust to be a sham dates from the last decade of the 20th century (Midland Bank plc v Wyatt [1997] 1 BCLC 242). Finally, Scottish courts have occasionally applied the doctrine of sham transactions, but usually by reference to modern English authorities rather than Scottish ones.

Yet, Kinghorn v Wood (1626) Mor. 5072 seems to suggest that both trusts and sham trusts existed in Scotland as early as the early 17th century. Naturally, the trust in question did not go by the name of ‘trust’, and the ‘sham’ was not yet named ‘sham’.  The word ‘trust’ started to be used in Scotland only in the course of the 17th century,[3] and the word ‘sham’ had not yet originated in the English-speaking world.[4] In substance, however, the court found an arrangement that we would nowadays call a trust to be a sham as that term has come to be understood.

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Scottish Trust Law Reform and the Role for the Courts

by Daniel J. Carr, Senior Lecturer in Private Law, Edinburgh Law School

A.  INTRODUCTION

Change is coming to trusts law in Scotland. November 2022 saw the introduction of the Trusts and Succession (Bill) (“the Bill”) in the Scottish Parliament, and on 15th September 2023 the Delegated Powers and Reform Committee (“the Committee”) published its broadly supportive Stage 1 Report on the Trusts and Succession (Scotland) Bill (“the S1 Report”). The Parliament is scheduled to hold the Stage 1 Debate on the Bill on 28th September 2023. It is, therefore, a good time to build upon several of the Committee’s recommendations to illustrate the potentially significant change in the role of the courts heralded by the Bill’s current form.[1] The cumulative effect of the Bill’s provisions[2] is to increase the scope for the courts’ involvement, potentially significantly altering the culture and approach to Scottish trusts by changing the courts’ terms of engagement with trusts and trustees. What happens in the evolution of that engagement will determine much of the substantive doctrine and practical content of trust law, and therefore the very nature of the Scottish trust as a legal institution.

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The Need for More (And Better) Private Law in Digital Asset Markets

By Christopher K. Odinet, Josephine R. Witte Professor of Law, University of Iowa; MacCormick Fellow (2023), University of Edinburgh.

For years now, the law around digital asset transactions has been very much up for debate, with some jurisdictions being more active than others in setting the legal parameters around these novel arrangements.  For example, the Singapore International Commercial Court ruled in B2C2 Ltd v Quoine Pte Ltd (2019)[1] that crypto assets can be viewed as property, similar to the English court’s decision in AA v. Persons Unknown involving Bitcoin[2] and the New Zealand High Court’s ruling in Ruscoe and Moore v. Cryptopia Limited (In Liquidation) which held that cryptocurrencies constituted “a species of intangible personal property.”[3] In contrast, in the United States, the law surrounding digital assets has been slow to take shape. Both federal and state courts have approached this area timidly and amendments to statutory commercial laws have started to be considered only recently—specifically, the 2022 amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code.[4]

But, as written elsewhere,[5] the stagnation enveloping this area of the law in the United States appears to be at an end. Following the pattern seen in other jurisdictions, U.S. bankruptcy courts find themselves on the frontlines, confronting a multitude of private law matters stemming from novel transactions involving digital assets. FTX, the world’s third-largest cryptocurrency exchange, declared bankruptcy on November 14, 2022. In July 2022, the crypto lending platform Celsius also sought bankruptcy protection. Additional crypto company insolvencies involving Three Arrow Capital and Voyager Holdings also occurred that summer.

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CBDC as a financial inclusion toolkit and preparing the relevant legal framework

By Fransiska Ari Indrawati, PhD Candidate, Edinburgh Law School*

Throughout most of history, money as a tool of payment has taken the form of tangible objects such as coins and banknotes. However, the rapid development of digital technology has changed the payment landscape. In the UK, for example, most of the liquid funds used in payments nowadays consist of intangible bank deposits. So far, these are all privately-created forms of money rather than state-issued legal tender.

However, this may be about to change. Many central banks are seeking to expand the supply of state-issued intangible money by introducing central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). CBDCs are a form of digital fiat money issued by a central bank. It is simplest to think of them as traditional coins or banknotes issued by a central bank but existing in a purely digital form. CBDCs thus circulate alongside tangible forms of money and perform their traditional functions, i.e., as a unit of account, medium of exchange, and store of value.

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Child Marriage: Global trends and future prospects – Part 2

by Katy Macfarlane, Senior Lecturer in Child and Family Law, University of Edinburgh.

In Part 1 of this blog, I examined the work of UNICEF and the UNFPA to end the practice of child marriage by 2030. What has this got to do with Scotland? The majority of the consequences of child marriage that are highlighted in Part 1 do not apply in Scotland – do they? We live in a progressive, child-focussed, child-centred society. We care about children and child protection – don’t we? In Scotland, the average age of the parties to a marriage is mid-30s. The average age that a woman in Scotland gives birth is between the ages of 30 and 34.[1]

Scotland can ably demonstrate that, in setting the legal minimum age for marriage and civil partnership at 16, it has complied with the relevant international human rights conventions. For example, Article 2 of the UN Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (which the UK ratified in 1970) states that, “States Parties […] shall take legislative action to specify a minimum age for marriage […]”.and it goes on to say that, “No marriage shall be legally entered into by a person under this age”.

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