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Category: Contracts

James Wood of Wallhouse and the Law of Contractual Misrepresentation: Woods v Tulloch (1893)

by Professor Hector MacQueen, Emeritus Professor of Private Law, Edinburgh Law School*

Back in 2012 I was honoured to be asked to deliver that year’s James Wood Memorial Lecture in Glasgow University Law School. My title was “Private Law, National Identity and the Case of Scotland”. But I thought that before I started on the substance, I should say a few words about James Wood. No previous lecturer appeared to have done so and before the invitation I did not know anything about him. The life and remarkable business career of James Wood of Wallhouse in Torphichen, West Lothian are however well set out in the Dictionary of Scottish Business Biography.[1]  Born in Paisley in 1840, from his early 20s he was a coal merchant and mine-owner around the greater Glasgow area. In 1871 Wood expanded his mining interests into, first, Armadale (West Lothian) and then other places in the county such as Bathgate. His business activities in the area extended in due course to gas, brickworks, steel works and the shale oil industry as well as coal-mining. The business, which was run in partnership with his brother William, came to have offices in London and New York, as well as Glasgow. William looked after sales and merchanting while James concentrated on colliery development and operations. Having been chairman of the Pumpherston Shale Oil Company from the mid-1880s, James became a more or less professional company director after 1900, working in a wide variety of Scottish companies. As his biographer remarks, “his experience and expertise in the business world made him a much sought-after figure to serve on company boards.”

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Six things you should know about Stair’s theory of contract law.

by Dr Stephen Bogle, Senior Lecturer in Private Law, University of Glasgow

Contract before the Enlightenment: the ideas of James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair, 1619-1695 was published in March this year by Oxford University Press. It investigates the intellectual impulses which inspired Viscount Stair’s transformative account of the law of contract. In his wide-ranging, Institutions of the Law of Scotland first published in 1681,[1] Stair offers a specific title on ‘conventional obligations’, which includes an examination of contracts, unilateral promises, firm offers, acceptance, and third-party contracts, as well as remedies, followed by separate titles on nominate contracts (loan, mandate custody, sale, hire and society). It is seen as foundational to the law of contract in Scotland. As Martin Hogg said in his pioneering study of Stair, ‘Any understanding of the nature of the Scots law of obligations, including the theory of Scots contract law, must begin with the Institutions of the Law of Scotland.’[2] The book, therefore, offers a fresh examination of what inspired Stair to place the law of contract on a new philosophical basis. This post gives a summary of the book’s central themes. In other words, it tells you six things you should know about Stair’s account of contract law.

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The implied term of good faith in English contract law: a view from North of the border

by Prof Laura Macgregor, Chair of Scots Law, Edinburgh Law School*

At the time of writing, the Scottish courts have not yet had the opportunity fully to consider the English implied term of contractual good faith (in Unicorn Tower Ltd v HSBC Bank plc [2018] CSOH 30 [72], Lady Wolffe held that there was no need to adjudicate on the parties’ submissions on this question). This is not surprising: the flow of Scottish reported cases is relatively small, and (Unicorn aside) no case has been reported in which a Scottish court has been asked to apply the relevant English precedents.

Whether a Scottish court would be obliged to apply those English precedents in the context of a suitable case is a difficult question. The law of implied terms in English and Scots contract law is similar, and English precedents are routinely cited and applied in the Scottish courts. That is not the case, however, with contractual good faith. Scots law contains a native, albeit nascent and under-developed, idea of contractual good faith. In a House of Lords case from 2004 Lord Hope stated: “Good faith in Scottish contract law […] is generally an underlying principle of an explanatory and legitimating rather than an active or creative nature” (R v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport, ex parte European Roma Rights Centre [2004] UKHL 55, [2005] 2 AC 1, [60]). More recently, the Inner House of the Court of Session reasserted the existence of good faith without expanding on its source or nature (Van Oord UK Ltd v Dragados UK Ltd [2021] CSIH 50).

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What evidence can be taken into account in interpreting a contract? Prohibiting reference to pre-contractual negotiations and the effect of an entire agreement clause

by Ms Lorna Richardson, Senior Lecturer in Commercial Law

Scots law, like English law, generally prohibits the use of pre-contractual negotiations when interpreting a contract. This is in contrast to the position in many civilian systems where such negotiations are taken into account in determining what a contract means. The DCFR also permits reference to pre-contractual negotiations, as part of the circumstances in which the contract was entered into, when interpreting a contract (Art II-8:102(1)). The exclusion of such evidence in Scots law is not however absolute and it can be referred to in certain circumstances, for instance, to show that a fact was known to both parties at the time of contract formation, such fact forming part of the “factual matrix” against which the words of the contract must be considered.

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Formation of Contract in Scots Law: Applying the Governing Principles

by Laura Macgregor, Professor of Scots Law, University of Edinburgh.

Many types of contracts do not require to be entered into in writing in Scots law (see Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s1). Where this is the case, it can be difficult to identify whether the parties have reached binding consensus or something short of that. It is possible for parties to reach consensus on all essential terms, and yet agree that they will not be contractually bound until such time as a written contract is signed (Karoulias SA v The Drambuie Liqueur Company Ltd 2005 SLT 813). In Supaseal Glass Ltd v Inverclyde Windows Manufacturing Ltd ([2022] CSOH 49), a recent case decided in the Outer House of the Court of Session, Lord Braid provides a useful summary of the governing principles of formation of contract in Scots law. His objective analysis nicely illustrates Lord President Dunedin’s famous statement that “[c]ommercial contracts cannot be arranged by what people think in their inmost minds. Commercial contracts are made according to what people say” (Muirhead and Turnbull v Dickson (1905) 7F 686 at 694).

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