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Category: Legal History

Romantic Partner Torts: Contemporary Problems and the Legal History of Taking Heartbreak Seriously

by Dr Jinal Dadiya, Lecturer in Law, Goldsmiths University of London

Introduction

There has been a recent rise in former romantic partners instituting tortious actions against one another for events which took place within the course of their romantic relationships. This is the case both in the UK,[1] and in other common law jurisdictions.[2] In the last year, English courts have seen at least two influential personalities being sued by their romantic partners in tort.[3] Currently, the law of obligations tries to resolve such disputes by applying general standards of private law, without however recognising special duties or exceptions on account of the parties’ romantic involvement. This reticence has been rationalised through appeals to discretion, emotional complexity, the public-private divide, and the perceived moral volatility of intimacy.[4] As courts and legislatures confront coercive control, emotional manipulation, and technologically mediated abuse, an important jurisprudential reconsideration is underway: what constitutes a civil wrong in the context of romantic relationships, and how might tort law be recalibrated to attend to it? In this blog entry, I argue that normative answers may be found in legal histories of heartbreak.

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Money as Thing and Money as Functions

by David Fox, Professor of Common Law, University of Edinburgh

  1. Introduction

Lawyers are wary of providing universal definitions even of their most fundamental concepts. Money is a prime example. There is no authoritative definition of money that allows us to identify with certainty all those things that serve as money in the law and those that do not.  If lawyers have any view of the range of things they treat as money, then it is one informed by its commonly-stated economic functions.[1]  Economists often take the view that “money is what money does”.[2]  Thus the textbook economic definitions generally say that money is a medium of exchange and a unit of account. From these follow other secondary functions, such as to serve as a store of value and a standard of deferred payment.[3]

The purpose of this blog entry is to suggest that the economists’ functional approach to understanding money is also the right one for lawyers to take. Money in the law is an aggregation of legally recognised functions. It is a kind of composite entity.  Its most important functions are to serve as the notional bearer of a certain number of units of monetary value and to discharge debts.  While those functions are attributed by law to certain things (such as coins, banknotes or liquid bank balances), these things are subsumed by the larger legal functions attributed to them.  The functions become more important than the thing itself.

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Homer, Paulus, and the Evolution of Economic Exchange – Part II

by David Fox, Professor of Common Law, University of Edinburgh

Introduction

As we saw in the first part of this blog entry, Paulus explains all three of the exchange transactions in the Homeric texts as instances of permutatio.  If we focus only on the material things passing in each direction, that characterisation seems accurate enough.  But that view would overlook the non-material differences among them, which in Homeric times would have separated the transactions into distinct kinds of exchange.  Each had a different motivation which would have placed it in a distinct domain of social activity.  The distinctions among them become still more blurred if we translate permutatio simply as “barter”, which has connotations of a commercially-motivated exchange, one that differs from purchase only in the absence of money.

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Homer, Paulus, and the Evolution of Economic Exchange – Part I

by David Fox, Professor of Common Law, University of Edinburgh

Introduction

The opening text of Book XVIII of Justinian’s Digest, on the contract of purchase, quotes an excerpt from Paulus’ Commentary on the Edict.[1]  In this text, Paulus develops a legal test for distinguishing two kinds of exchange: the contract of purchase (emptio) on the one hand and the contract of barter (permutatio) on the other.  Purchase, he says, consists in one party paying a money price (pretium) in exchange for the thing (merx) that is promised and delivered by the other party.  By contrast, a barter is a transaction where the parties promise and exchange two non-monetary things.

Paulus goes on to develop a sharp definition of money for the purposes of his rule.  The monetary price, he says, should consist in coins (nummi) struck in authorised form by the public mint.  For Paulus, the delivery of coined money on one side of the exchange marks the identifying characteristic of a contract of purchase.

Justinian authoritatively accepted Paulus’ view.[2]  His ruling put beyond dispute that purchase and barter were distinct contracts in the revived Roman law of the sixth century AD, and that each had to be enforced by its own distinct actions.  In so ruling, he settled an old disagreement between the Sabinian and Proculian schools of juristic thought.[3]

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Books – Part of Our Legal Culture

by Professor Reinhard Zimmermann, Emeritus (Director) of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg

“Mr. Booker, however, would review such a book as Lady Carbury’s ‘Criminal Queens’ without bestowing much trouble on the reading. He could do it almost without cutting the book, so that its value for purposes of after sale might not be injured”: Anthony Trollope, ‘The Way We Live Now’, Chapter 1. 

 (i) Modern academic life is characterized by an apparently unstoppable trend towards specialization. At the same time, we are faced with a proliferation of legal literature. It becomes more and more difficult to follow developments in areas not directly relevant to one’s own field of research. (ii) Contrary to the natural sciences and economics, law is a field of research where the writing of books constitutes a long-established and essential means of producing knowledge. In a number of countries (Germany and Italy among them) a scholar has to write two books in order to qualify for an academic career. In other countries (England and Scotland, for example) an aspiring academic usually has to write a PhD thesis which, in a revised version, is often subsequently published as a book. (iii) With so much writing going on, nobody can read all new law books, even those in a limited field such as contract law, or constitutional law. 

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