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Student Blog – Ectogenesis: Equality or Captivity for Women?

The following post is part of the Mason Institute student blog series which publishes the excellent work undertaken by Edinburgh postgraduate students on the Contemporary Issues in Medical Jurisprudence course, which forms part of our Masters in Medical Law and Ethics degree programme.

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Introduction

Imagine a world where women could avoid morning sickness, high blood pressure and the contractions associated with pregnancy—a world where women no longer had to go through nine long months to have genetically related children. Full ectogenesis could make this world a reality and allow human gestation to occur entirely outside the female body. Whilst currently impossible, developments in partial ectogenesis and constant technological advancement make the future of full ectogenesis probable. In this blog, I introduce the equality-promoting argument that some use to argue in favour of legalising full ectogenesis. I then offer three objections to the argument before concluding that a world in which full ectogenesis exists could be anything but equalising for women.

The equality-promoting argument

Advocates for full ectogenesis claim that its use could redress the social inequality between men and women. They argue that pregnancy and its associated maternity leave are critical drivers in causing the gender pay gap and that removing the need for women to undergo physical pregnancy could go a long way to curing this inequality. It is also argued that ectogenesis would promote equality among groups of women who, for example, are fertile and infertile, as they would all be able to have genetically related children.

Tackling the wrong issue

My first objection to the argument is that it places too much emphasis on pregnancy’s role in creating a gender-unequal society. Most importantly, it ignores the fact that women undertake significantly more unpaid care work in relation to child-rearing and thus face physical and social inequality when they decide to have children. This social inequality is arguably a more critical issue, as caring throughout childhood involves gender disparity for much longer than pregnancy.

Some argue that ectogenesis could solve this social inequality too, and that as women become more detached from the physical act of giving birth, they may become more independent from pressures related to caring for children. Whilst this argument does have some merit, society could feasibly turn the other way too. If women are ‘freed’ from physically giving birth to children, I wonder whether they could become expected to take on more care work. If a woman is not going through the difficulties associated with pregnancy, then perhaps some may argue that she will become more responsible for social parenting than she previously was. Gender expectations and norms are pervasive in our society, and it is too simplistic to believe that by removing physical pregnancy with ectogenesis, that will disappear.

‘Equality-promoting’ must entail equal access

My second objection to the equality-promoting argument is that it assumes a world where all women have equal access to ectogenesis, which seems highly unlikely. Proponents of the argument suggest that it will have an equalising effect among groups of women who, for example, struggle to give birth naturally versus those who do not. However, this ignores the fact that there is a vast financial inequality between different groups of women.

In the UK, it seems unlikely that every woman would have free access to ectogenesis on the NHS because, for most women, it is not necessary. Even if the NHS did offer, for example, three attempts at ectogenesis, as they do with IVF cycles, there is still the issue of what happens beyond this. Presumably, wealthier women could access the technology more easily in the private sector. This risks creating even more inequality between rich and poor women, as more affluent women may be able to retain more wealth as they take less time away from work.

Increased expectations

My third objection to the equality-promoting argument is that it may not promote equality at all but add yet another expectation upon women. I wonder whether, in future, employers could offer full ectogenesis to their employees as a new ‘perk.’ Whilst this may seem like a far-fetched pitch of a dystopian world, we have seen perks such as breastmilk shipping and egg-freezing offered to women in recent years. These changes are traditionally considered positive steps to encourage more gender diversity in the workplace. Still, they may send women signals about what is expected of them: remaining in or quickly returning to formal employment. If ectogenesis were to be offered as a ‘perk’, then would women genuinely choose to use full ectogenesis, or would they simply feel pressure from their employers or society to forgo the experience of giving birth in the standard way to continue working? Of course, this argument is entirely speculative. Still, women may feel they should continue working and use ectogenesis to better financially support their child.

It is important to remember that in presenting women with a ‘choice’ of whether to use ectogenesis, society would inevitably create expectations regarding the choice women should make. The equality-promoting argument rests on the idea that equality in the workplace means complete equality for women and that career development is a ‘universal desirability.’ In prioritising this view of women’s equality, I wonder whether we could further contribute to the devaluing of unpaid care work and begin a new era of oppression against women who do not choose ectogenesis.

Caution over optimism

Full ectogenesis, where women are relieved from physically going through pregnancy, may become a possibility in future. Some argue that this would create more equality in society and would, for example, close the gender pay gap between men and women. This blog has presented three ways this argument is problematic: it tackles the wrong issue, does not adequately consider access, and may place certain expectations on women, which make it far from equalising. Perhaps I have presented a somewhat cynical view, but new technologies should be cautiously approached, particularly when their consequences could be so far-reaching. Approaching full ectogenesis as a panacea to gender equality is problematic. It reduces discussions around male-female inequality to pregnancy and ignores much of the social context in which ectogenesis would be implemented.

References

Kleeman, J. ‘Parents can look at their foetus in real time’: Are artificial wombs the future?’ (2020) The Guardian. Guardian News and Media. Available at: <www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2020/jun/27/parents-can-look-foetus-real-time-artificial-wombs-future> accessed April 11, 2023.

Freethink. Should we grow babies in artificial wombs? | Brit benjamin for heretics, YouTube. (2022) YouTube. <www.youtube.com/watch?v=qFPu18hDg5w> accessed April 11, 2023.

UK public cautiously optimistic about genetic technologies (2018) The Royal Society. <www.royalsociety.org/news/2018/03/genetic-technologies/> accessed April 11, 2023.

Kendal, E. ‘Equal opportunity and the case for state sponsored ectogenesis’ (2015) SpringerLink. Palgrave Macmillan UK.  <www.link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9781137549877> accessed April 11, 2023.

NHS, ‘IVF availability’. (2021) NHS choices. NHS. <www.nhs.uk/conditions/ivf/availability/#:~:text=Although%20NICE%20recommend%20up%20to,is%20available%20in%20your%20area> accessed April 11, 2023.

Bishop, K. ‘How fertility became a workplace perk’ (2022) BBC Worklife. BBC. <www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20211008-how-fertility-became-a-workplace-perk> accessed April 11, 2023.

Cavaliere, G. ‘Gestation, equality and freedom: Ectogenesis as a political perspective, Journal of Medical Ethics’ (2019)  <www.jme.bmj.com/content/medethics/46/2/76.full.pdf> accessed April 11, 2023.

About the author

This blog post was written by Morag McKirdy, LLM student in Medical Law & Ethics, in April 2023 for the Contemporary Issues in Medical Jurisprudence course.

Photo by Aditya Romansa on Unsplash

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