From the 24th to the 27th of June, the French Research Consortium “Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies” hold his sixth Congress at the University of Strasbourg. In this context, I (PostDoc Noëmie Lucas) co-organised with Eugénie Rébillard, a panel devoted to the dynamics between Coercion and Taxation in the Islamic World during the Pre-Modern Period.
Eugénie and I have been talking about taxation for years now, in the context of our respective research. Eugénie is currently a researcher at the Ifpo in Beirut where she is pursuing her research on the History of Security Institutions under the Abbasids (her first monograph Imposer l’ordre : la police dans les villes et les campagnes de l’Iraq abbasside (132-334/750-945) recently appeared with the Presses de l’Ifpo). She is notably editing and translating into French an anonymous manuscript that includes an extensive section devoted to the administration of the kharāj. The Caliphal Finances team had the great pleasure to spend two days with her and Matthew Gordon last November.
One of the many aspects of our scientific exchanges deals with the role played by coercion in the fiscal system. In the panel we had the opportunity to organise within the 6th Congress of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, we explored the dynamics between taxation and coercion and considered the Islamic empire in its entirety (from modern-day Afghanistan to Spain), aiming at emphasising geographical and chronological diversity from a diachronic perspective. We were fortunate to gather colleagues that allow for this and complete our own expertise on Egypt and Iraq.
Poster of the Event
Our panel took place on the last day and on the last session of the afternoon but it attracted about fifteen attendees who endured the scorching heat with us.
While I presented part of my research about fiscal revolts focusing on the Egyptian uprisings, how they were suppressed and how this suppression was narrated (Title of the communication Fiscal Revolts in Abbasid Egypt: Use of Force and Caliphal Perception), Eugénie presented on The armed arm of the tax collector. About the fiscal role of the maʿāwin and the aḥdāth in Iraq and the western Iranian provinces. Both our presentations were mostly focusing on the ninth century.
Arezou Azad joined us to talk about Taxation and Fear in 12th-13th Century Khurasan: The Tax Collector’s Dilemna. She notably presented the rich corpus she is working with in the framework of her project Invisible East and touched upon an important aspect of the role played by coercion in the fiscal administration, the one the tax collector, the very same often casts to oppressed the taxpayers, would have experienced from the State. She notably used the thesis that Chris Wickham argued in the context of the Roman Empire about the “terror of tax collection” and explored how we could apply it to the tax collectors’ experience.
With Clarck Junior Membourou Moimecheme, who talked about coercion and the collection of illegal taxes (mukūs) in the Meccan Emirate in the 14th century, we dealt with the tricky question of illegal taxes. Clarck particularly focused on the taxes that the emirs of Mecca, the Banu Qatāda, imposed on pilgrims, local populations, and merchants, often using coercion.
Elise Voguet gave the final presentation before our discussion. Her presentation was titled “Nomads and Sedentary People of Touat: How Was the Political and Fiscal Autonomy of a Saharan Region Organized (14th-15th Century).” In this, she shared her research on the role of Arab tribes in the monetary submission of the Touat region (southwest Algeria) and more broadly on taxation in this context. She noted that coercion was socially legitimized; some trade routes were left unprotected while others benefited from the protection of tribes collecting taxes on goods, acting as a protection tax or easement. Additionally, she mentioned how taxes were discussed by jurists in the Nawāzil (collection of historical legal judgments), addressing the legality of these taxes versus bribery (rashwā) depending on who collected them.
The discussion that followed our five presentations revolved around terms and terminology concerning taxes, including what made a tax illegal, and conversely, what made a tax legitimate. Is the qualification of “illegal” directly the result of a certain perspective? For instance, the perspective of the authors of the source material we study. We also broached the topic of the importance of the Abbasid period in framing certain fiscal practices and administration, possibly empire-wide. The second half of the ninth century appears particularly key here, which our respective research within the project framework confirms.
To know more about the panel:
Abstract of the Panel
Fiscal administration, and taxation in general, was a key aspect of governance as early as the first decades of the Islamic conquests. It offers a multifaceted historical entry point, particularly suited to studies of society and the dynamics between taxpayers and the state—however one may define it. In the introduction to the volume Ancient Taxation, The Mechanics of Extraction in Comparative Perspective, which he co-edited with Irene Soto Marin, Jonathan Valk lists several reasons to explain why people in ancient polities would agree to pay taxes: ideology, coercion, the provision of stability and security, social inertia, and the influence of co-opted elements of the social order that enforced compliance, as well as provision of institutions.
This workshop will focus on coercion and explore the dynamics between taxation and coercion. We will consider the Islamic empire in its entirety (from modern-day Afghanistan to Spain), emphasising geographical and chronological diversity from a diachronic perspective. Moreover, the aim is to draw on a wide variety of narrative and documentary sources to fully grasp how these issues were addressed depending on the materials used.
Two key aspects of the relationship between taxation and coercion will be particularly examined:
- Coercion during the collection of taxes
Seen primarily as a means to prevent non-payment of taxes, we are particularly interested in forms of pressure, such as intimidation. The role of institutional or non-state forces in fulfilling this task is of particular interest to us. This workshop will pay special attention to the actors involved in fiscal administration and coercion, to highlight collaborations and/or competitions between law enforcement and tax officials. Is there a discernible rationale linking different types of taxes with different actors? We also aim to explore the varying degrees of coercion, including the use of physical force, the types of constraints, and the scales of penalties. In this context, we are equally interested in theoretical discussions about the links between taxation and coercion.
- Coercion and the use of force in response to tax non-payment.
In contrast, the second focus of our workshop considers coercion as a response to tax non-payment, whether due to delays, such as tax arrears, or outright refusal, sometimes accompanied by revolts labelled as tax-related uprisings. We will examine the role and form that coercion and the use of force take in these scenarios. We will also consider other possible responses that precede or accompany coercion, such as persuasion or negotiation.
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Noëmie Lucas (University of Edinburgh) Fiscal Revolts in Abbasid Egypt: Use of Force and Caliphal Perception
For over a century, the history of Abbasid Egypt (750–860s) was punctuated by a series of uprisings of varying scales, consistently described in narrative sources as being rooted in fiscal grievances. These revolts posed significant economic, political, and military challenges for the Abbasid state, which relied heavily on Egypt’s fiscal revenues—considered the second-largest source of income for the empire. This presentation examines how these uprisings were suppressed by local, regional, and imperial forces, with a particular focus on the methods used to resolve these revolts—particularly through force. Through this analysis, we aim to explore caliphal perceptions of these events and the broader implications of their resolution.
We will emphasize the diversity of narrative perspectives, comparing sources produced in Egypt with those originating from other regions, especially Iraq. Finally, we will assess whether these so-called fiscal revolts reflected a refusal to pay taxes, and, if so, investigate the underlying motivations driving such resistance.
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Eugénie Rébillard (Ifpo Beyrouth) The armed arm of the tax collector. About the fiscal role of the maʿāwin and the aḥdāṯ in Iraq and the western Iranian provinces
This contribution sets out to shed light on the little-known role of rural police forces (maʿāwin and aḥdāṯ) in tax collection in rural Iraq and western Iran in the Abbasid period. These intervened upstream of the collection and also participated in the repression of those who could not pay taxes. I will rely on two unpublished manuscript documents produced during the second half of the 3rd century / 11th century detailing the missions of these police forces in the field of taxation.
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Arezou Azad (Inalco) Taxation and Fear in 12th-13th Century Khurasan: The Tax Collector’s Dilemma
The history of medieval taxation in eastern Khurasan (modern-day Afghanistan) is often reduced to a narrative of two opposing forces: the tax collector, feared for his authority and harshness, and the taxpayer, burdened and oppressed by the demands of payment. But what if the tax collector himself was uneasy or even “terrorized” by the pressures imposed by the state? This perspective, argued by medieval historian Chris Wickham in the context of the Roman Empire, opens a new dimension to consider. In this paper, I will examine evidence from the 12th-13th century documentary record from Afghanistan to test the validity of the “terror of tax collection” thesis. Additionally, I will analyse prescriptive narrative sources that emphasize the moral obligations in tax collection and propose explanations for why these rituals endured despite significant structural challenges.
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Membourou Moimecheme Clarck Junior (Université de Strasbourg) Coercion and the Collection of Illegal Taxes (mukūs) in the Meccan Emirate in the 14th Century
Fifteenth-century Meccan authors, notably al-Fāsī and the Banū Fahd, emphasize that the expansion of the Meccan emirate beyond the holy city was essential for its material survival. The sharif-emirs of the Banū Qatāda dynasty, rulers of Mecca since the early thirteenth century, had strengthened their fiscal policies by adapting to local sociopolitical and conflictual dynamics. This study explores how the collection of illegal taxes (mukūs) evolved into a tool of power, revealing multiscalar coercive practices imposed on pilgrims, merchants, and local populations, while Mecca’s embargo became a formidable politico-economic weapon for the local sharifs.
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Elise Voguet (IRHT/CNRS) Nomads and sedentary people of Touat: How was the political and fiscal autonomy of a Saharan region organized (14th-15th century
Despite the attempts of the Maghreb powers to control the Touat, this Saharan region is characterized above all by a high degree of autonomy. As Ibn Khaldûn mentions, the populations there “stay away from submission to the laws (al-aḥkām) and taxes (al-maghārim)”. How was this political and fiscal autonomy organized at the local level? What were the relations of the sultanates with the Tuati populations, nomadic or sedentary? How did these populations manage and develop their territories? The comparison of Maghreb literary sources with Saharan jurisprudence allows us to question the only relationships of predation and submission that would be exercised to the detriment of the oases.
Banner Image: Strasbourg’s Cathedral (Photo taken by Noëmie Lucas)
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