Author: Nick Tompkins

Affective polarisation – the tendency of partisans to distrust and dislike those from the other party – has become one of the defining features of the American political climate. Research indicates that levels of animosity between supporters of the two parties has reached record highs in recent years, to the point that partisans’ animus towards the opposing party and its members now exceeds their amity towards their own party. While experimental research has identified promising treatments for increased levels of affective polarisation in America, further research is needed to identify viable implementation methods of these treatments which have long-lasting effects.

The causes and consequencese of affective polarisation

The main approach to the cause of affective polarisation emphasizes the role of identities. According to this approach, partisanship functions as a social identity, off which partisans develop a psychological connection to their party. This connection leads partisans to develop a ‘tribal’ instinct, causing people to view politics through an ‘us-versus-them’ lens, where partisans distinguish between people in their group and people in the opposing group. Subsequently, this ‘us-versus-them’ categorization causes individuals to attach negative emotions to members of the opposing group/party and positive emotions to members within their own group/party.

Research suggests that a main driver of affective polarization is partisans’ tendency to inaccurately stereotype and misperceive members of the opposition party. Studies have shown that both Republicans and Democrats hold inaccurate stereotypes of the demographic composition of the opposition party and that partisans hold significant misperceptions about the ideological extremity of the opposition party. Because partisans hold these misperceptions and therefore perceive a greater social and ideological distance between themselves and the opposition party, this facilitates and fuels their dislike and distrust towards opposition members.

Research shows that the media and politicians have also played a significant role in exacerbating affective polarization in America. Studies have shown that an increasing proclivity toward divisive rhetoric from party leaders and the rise of a divided partisan media amplify individuals partisan social identity and their usage of the ‘us-versus-them’ categorization.

It is important to note that research has also identified economic and social divides as wider long-term drivers of affective polarization. These drivers are particularly pertinent to the U.S. case, where economic inequality has risen markedly over past decades and U.S. politics has become increasingly socially sorted, whereby partisan identity has increasingly aligned with social identities (e.g. white evangelicals concentrating support around the Republican party and racial minorities consolidating around the Democratic party). As research demonstrates, the alignment of social identities with parties heightens affective polarization, increasing social difference between the parties and therefore dislike and distrust between opposition members.

Affective polarisation, at its current levels in the US, has been shown to have several worrying political effects. Global evidence suggests that higher levels of affective polarisation undermines democratic principles and norms. Because affectively-charged partisans view the opposition party as the enemy, partisans may be more willing to endorse and participate in non-democratic actions to hinder and question the electoral success of that opposition party. Indeed, scholarship has linked increased levels of affective polarisation to the January 6^th insurrection as well as the questioning of the integrity of recent Presidential elections. Further, research points to several worrying apolitical implications of increased affective polarisation, surrounding citizen relations.

Solutions to affective polarisation

Having recognized that inaccurate stereotypes and misperceptions by partisans of the ideological and demographic composition of the opposition party and its members are central drivers to affective polarisation, research into possible treatments has primarily focused on inducing partisans to avoid such stereotyping and instead recognize common-ground between themselves and opposing supporters. Two broad approaches have been identified within this research as follows:

• Correcting Partisan-Based Stereotypes

Multiple studies have found that when information was provided to partisans correcting their pre-existing stereotypes and misperceptions of the opposition party and its members, this allowed partisans to realize that they are far less socially and ideologically distant to the oppositional party and its members than they originally perceived and consequently those partisans’ feelings of animosity towards the opposition fell significantly.

• Promotion of a Shared Identity

This approach aims at overriding individuals’ partisan identities by emphasizing that they are also members of a common group, namely that they are all Americans. Studies have found that emphasizing American national identity to partisans can significantly reduce affective polarisation as rival partisans come to see each other as fellow Americans.

Two problems remain regarding these approaches’ wider implementation across the American public. The first is that the treatments identified in an experimental context only had short-term effects in reducing partisan animus. The effects of the most successful intervention, which managed to reduce partisan animus within participants to 1980s levels, only lasted for a week following the treatment before partisan animus returned to pre-experimental levels. Secondly, it is unclear how these treatments could be scaled to apply across the American public. One potential implementation method that has been suggested is the use of bridging programs, similar to those developed in America in the 1960s to deal with the racial divide. Such programs would bring partisans into contact to discuss the affective divide in the hope that participating partisans would realize their misperceptions of each other and recognize their shared common identity. However, no evidence exists as to whether such programs, originally devised to bridge divide originating from characteristics that participants were born into (race) could be successfully applied to identities that people choose (partisanship). Further research is therefore necessary to identify viable implementation methods with long-lasting effects for the treatment options which research has already identified.

As noted, partisan stereotyping and misperceptions constitute one of a number of complementary drivers of affective polarization. Therefore, these more issue-specific approaches which research has focused upon will likely have to be implemented in conjunction with solutions reducing economic and social divides and focusing on tempering the impacts of divisive rhetoric from party leaders and the partisan media, to effectively address affective polarization in the long-term.